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PARENTS, PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES: PROTECTING THE
PRIVILEGE AND THE CHILDREN
Marjorie Fine Knowles*
Caroline Chunn McCarthy**
I. Introduction
In In re Von Goyt,' a case of first impression for the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals, the mother of two infant children challenged the order of the Circuit Court for Tuscaloosa County, which
had affirmed the Tuscaloosa County Juvenile Court order terminating her parental rights on grounds of mental incompetence. 2
The circuit court based its ruling largely on information gleaned
from confidential medical records that were admitted into evidence
over Ms. Von Goyt's contention that the information concerning
her treatment at various mental health facilities was protected by
the statutory psychologist-patient privilege.3 On appeal, the court
of civil appeals addressed the issue whether "the court may disregard the psychologist-patient privilege in a custody proceeding."4
The appellate court's affirmative decision on this issue has
concerned Alabama lawyers and psychologists about the possible
erosion of testimonial privileges in this state.' This concern is
* Dean, Georgia State University College of Law;, B-A. 1960, Smith College; LLB. 1965,
Harvard University.
** Associate, Lyons, Pipes & Cook, Mobile, Alabama; BA. 1983, Southern Methodist
University;, J.D. 1986, University of Alabama.
1. 461 So. 2d 821 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984).
2. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 822.
3. See id. The psychologist-patient privilege is codified at ALA. CoDE § 34-26-2 (Supp.
1984) (current version at ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1985)).
4. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
5. This Article is limited to a discussion of legally privileged communications between
psychologists and patients in Alabama, and does not address ethical issues that may arise
with regard to the broader area of confidential communications. For a discussion of confidential communications of psychologists, see generally DeKraai & Sales, Confidential Communications of Psychotherapists,21 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 293, 293 (1984); Lyman & Roberts,
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heightened by the fact that Alabama's psychologist-patient privilege, by its terms, is identical to the attorney-client privilege,' and
therefore cases concerning one privilege may have an impact on
the interpretation of the other.
This Article first examines the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals' decision, focusing on that court's analysis of the law of other
jurisdictions. According to the Von Goyt court, the case law dictates that the psychologist-patient privilege must yield automatically in child custody matters.' This Article, however, argues that
the cases relied upon by the court can be reconciled with the view
that the court can serve the child's best interests in a custody determination without automatically disregarding the parent's right
to these privileged communications. Further, the Article suggests a
procedure by which courts can protect parents' rights while continuing to serve the paramount interests of the child.
Finally, this Article suggests that both the psychologist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege will be compromised if future Alabama courts adhere to the rule imprudently announced by the Von Goyt court.
II. In re Von Goyt
The initial proceedings arose when a social worker with the
Department of Pensions and Security became concerned about the
appearance and behavior of Maude Jones, Ms. Von Goyt's four
year old daughter. A pediatrician examined Maude at the social
worker's request and discovered traces of a tranquilizer in the
child's urine sample, whereupon the social worker and her supervisor filed a petition with the Tuscaloosa County Juvenile Court for
termination of Ms. Von Goyt's parental rights. The juvenile court
found that Ms. Von Goyt, because of her mental state, was unable
to fulfill her parental responsibilities and that "she was unable to
provide [her children] with a stable environment." 8 "The juvenile
court [then] terminated Ms. Von Goyt's parental rights and
Mental Health Testimony in Child Custody Litigation, 9 LAW & PsYcH. REV. 15 (1985).
6. Compare ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1985) (psychologist-patient privilege) with ALA.
CODE § 12-21-161 (1975) (attorney-client privilege); see infra note 102.
7. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
8. Id. at 822. At the time of the appeal, Ms. Von Goyt had one daughter, born in 1979,
and one son, born in 1982.
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awarded custody of the children to the [Department of Pensions
and Security] to be placed for adoption."
The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court heard the case de novo on appeal, and admitted into evidence Ms. Von Goyt's medical records
from Bryce Hospital and Indian Rivers Mental Health Center.10
Basing its order largely on information contained in these records,
and on the testimony of a counselor at the Indian Rivers facility
who clarified and interpreted diagnoses and characterizations of
Ms. Von Goyt from her medical records, 1 the circuit court affirmed the juvenile court's order. Ms. Von Goyt then appealed to
the court of civil appeals, challenging the admission of the medical
records into evidence as a violation of the privilege protecting communications between a patient and her psychologist." The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the termination of parental
rights and the admission of the medical records, stating that
where the state has petitioned our court to terminate a mother's
custody of her children because of her mental instability, the court
9. Id.
10. "These records encompassed a short period from August 1979 to December 1979
when [Von Goyt] was a patient [at Bryce Hospital] and from December 1979 to 1981 when
[she] was not a patient but still made contact with the hospital. Since 1981 there have been
no contacts with Bryce hospital [sic] by [Ms. Von Goyt], nor has there been a Bryce admission since 1979." Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d 821 (Ala. Civ. App.
1984).
Ms. Von Goyt's relationship with the Indian Rivers Mental Health Center is not entirely clear from the facts stated in either party's brief or in the court's opinion. The court's
rendition of the facts differs somewhat from those stated in the appellant's brief. For example, the court states that Ms. Von Goyt was re-admitted to Bryce Hospital in 1980, and that
she was "in and out of various mental institutions until July 1982. . . ." Von Goyt, 461 So.
2d at 822.
11. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 824. This Article does not address the issue of whether a
counselor affiliated with the licensed practice of psychology or psychiatry, but not herself a
licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, should be precluded from testifying under a patientpsychologist privilege. Alabama has provided a statutory privilege between a client and licensed professional counselor or certified counselor associate on the same terms as the privilege provided for licensed psychologists, psychiatrists, and attorneys. ALA. CODE § 34-8A-21
(1985). Arguably the Indian Rivers counselor should have been precluded from testifying
under that statute. However, it seems that a counselor working with a psychologist that has
the privilege would be in the same category as an investigator working for an attorney under
the attorney-client privilege.
The question whether the counselor in Von Goyt was qualified to testify as an expert
witness is likewise beyond the scope of this Article, although the appellate court affirmed
the circuit court's determination that this counselor was a quaified expert. Von Goyt, 461
So. 2d at 824.
12. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
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should be permitted to investigate her mental health records in order to determine whether a termination is necessary.13
The court reasoned that "the paramount consideration in a child
custody matter is the child's best interests"1' 4 and that "[a] court
cannot determine the best interests of the child without considering whether [the parent] is physically, financially, or mentally able
to care for the child." 15 Further, the court noted section 26-18-7 of
the Alabama Code,' 6 which mandates that a court consider, among
other factors, the "[e]motional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent" in proceedings for the termination of paren1
tal rights. 7
The Von Goyt court acknowledged that Alabama state courts
had never before addressed the issue whether a court, in a custody
proceeding, may override the psychologist-patient privilege.' 8
Therefore, the court cited several other state court opinions, apparently viewing them as authority for the result it reached."
However, the Von Goyt court failed to analyze these cases or the
statutory privileges as they operate in these other jurisdictions.
Thus, the court erred in attempting to apply such an analysis to
the case before it and to the operation of the Alabama statutory
privilege. The Von Goyt case is easily distinguished from the cases
the court cited, which in fact do not support the court's holding.
III. The In re Von Goyt Court's Analysis of the Law of Other
Jurisdictions
In the Florida case Critchlow v. Critchlow,2" Ms. Critchlow
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and for custody of the
parties' three-and-a-half year old daughter. Critchlow's husband
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Ezell v. Hammond, 447 So. 2d 766 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)).
15. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
16. Id.
17. ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)(2) (Supp. 1984) (current version at ALA. CODE § 26-187(a)(2) (Supp. 1985)).
18. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
19. Id. (citing Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re
A.J.S., 630 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1981); In re Norwood, 194 Neb. 595, 234 N.W.2d 601 (1975); D.
v. D., 108 N.J. Super., 149, 260 A.2d 255 (1969); People ex rel. Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc.
2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y. 287, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858,
250 N.E.2d 857 (1969)).
20. 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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filed a counterpetition which did not challenge his wife's prayer for
custody. Later, after Ms. Critchlow voluntarily committed herself
to a hospital for mental treatment, Mr. Critchiow amended his
counterpetition to include a plea for custody. The parties subsequently agreed to undergo an evaluation by a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine which parent was best suited to provide custodial care for the infant daughter. The psychiatrist recommended
that Ms. Critchlow be awarded custody, and counsel for the parties
then stipulated that each party could obtain copies of Ms. Critchlow's hospital records. Thereafter, the court authorized Mr. Critchlow to depose three of his wife's treating physicians, including the
court-appointed psychiatrist. Ms. Critchlow failed to object to this
authorization, and in fact, her counsel appeared at the deposition
of the appointed psychiatrist. Following this deposition, the parties
stipulated that Mr. Critchlow also could depose his wife's childhood physician. The court subsequently entered an order granting
21
temporary custody to Mr. Critchow.
In response, Ms. Critchlow filed "a motion for protective order
requesting that the depositions [of her two remaining treating physicians and her childhood physician] not be taken, and ... a motion to set aside the temporary custody order. ' 22 The trial court
denied the motion to set aside the temporary custody order, but
granted the protective order. Mr. Critchlow appealed the protective order, and the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed.23
The district court of appeals refused to honor Ms. Critchlow's
invocation of Florida's statutory patient-psychiatrist privilege24 on
the ground that she had waived the privilege when she failed to
object to the order authorizing her husband to depose the three
treating physicians and when she stipulated to the deposition of
her childhood physician. 25 Further, Ms. Critchlow had introduced
her mental condition as an element of her custody claim by alleging in her petition for dissolution of marriage "that she [was] a fit
and proper person to have custody of [the infant child]. '2 By in21.
22.
23.
24.
§ 90.503
25.
26.

Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 454.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.242 (West 1975) (now codified as amended at FLA. STAT. AN.
(Harrison 1979)).
Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 454.
Id.
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jecting her own mental condition into the proceedings, the court
held, Ms. Critchlow brought her case within a statutory exception
to Florida's psychologist-patient privilege that provides: "(3) There
shall be no privilege for any relevant communications under this
section: . . . (b) In a criminal or civil proceeding in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or
defense .... ,,27 Ms. Critchlow's petition, along with her agreement
to the appointment of a psychiatrist to determine which party
could best fulfill custodial responsibilities, introduced her mental
condition as an element of her custody claim. Her communications
with her treating psychiatrists, therefore, were excluded from the
protection of the privilege.28
Finally, the court stated that "the patient-psychiatrist privilege [could not] be invoked under the facts in this child custody
' The court therefore reversed the
case."29
protective order, and remanded the case to the trial court
to enter an order authorizing [Mr. Critchlow] to take the depositions
of [his wife's] treating physicians; but limiting the scope of those
examinations to communications, diagnosis and treatments insofar
as [Ms. Critchlow's]mental and emotional state relates to her fit30
ness as a mother.
The Von Goyt court cites Critchlow as support for the proposition that other state courts have held that the child's right to a
proper determination of custody outweighs the right of a party to a
custody proceeding to invoke the psychologist-patient privilege.,"
This blanket proposition goes beyond the confines of the Critchlow
opinion, which the Critchlow court explicitly limited to the facts in
that case.3 2 Further, Critchlow contained a number of circumstances that make it inappropriate as support for Von Goyt. First,
Von Goyt involved proceedings instituted by the Department of
Pensions and Security to terminate the custodial rights of the
child's natural mother and to place the child for adoption. The
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.242(3)(b) (West 1975) (now codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 90.503(4)(c) (Harrison 1979)) (emphasis added).
28. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 454-55.
29. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823 (citing Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
32. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 455.
ANN.
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Critchlow case, on the other hand, was a custody dispute between
the natural parents of the infant child. Von Goyt therefore involves a result which is inherently more drastic than any possible
outcome in the Critchlow dispute, for the court ordered the removal of the Von Goyt children from the custody of their natural
parent, and the placement of the children for adoption, so that the
whole of the natural family structure was permanently disrupted,
and Ms. Von Goyt's parental rights were terminated forever.33
Additionally, the appealing party in Critchlow failed to object
at the trial level to the depositions of her physicians, 3 ' while Ms.
Von Goyt exercised every opportunity to challenge the admission
of her medical records into evidence.3 5 Although the Critchlow
court determined that Ms. Critchlow's failure to object amounted
to a waiver of the privilege, 6 the Von Goyt court explicitly found
that Ms. Von Goyt had not waived her privilege. 7
Finally, and most significantly, the Florida privilege statute
includes specific stated exceptions to the protection of communications between psychiatrist and patient. That privilege does not extend to civil or criminal proceedings "in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or
defense .. ."s Ms. Critchlow brought her case within Florida's

statutory exception by virtue of her own actions. 3 Alabama's privilege statute contains no such stated exceptions. 40 And even if it
did, the issue of Ms. Von Goyt's mental condition was raised not
by Ms. Von Goyt herself, but by the Department of Pensions and
41
Security.
33. See R SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 371 (1973).
34. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 454.
35. See Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823. Appellee alleges that Ms. Von Goyt failed to
object to a counselor's testimony at an earlier hearing. Brief for Appellee at 13, In re Von
Goyt, 461 So. 2d 821 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). The court's opinion does not address this
allegation.
36. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d at 454.
37. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.242(3)(b) (West 1975) (now codified as amended at FL& STAT.
ANN. § 90.503(4)(c) (Harrison 1979)) (emphasis added). The language of the statute indicates that a waiver of the privilege occurs only when the patient himself introduces his
mental condition into the case. Id.
39. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
40. See ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1985).
41. Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 822. "In January 1984 Ms. Pitts [a social worker at the

Alabama Department of Pensions and Security] and her supervisor filed a petition in the
Tuscaloosa County Juvenile Court for termination of Miss Von Goyt's parental rights, alleg-
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The Von Goyt court also cites a Montana case as support for
the proposition that the psychologist-patient privilege must yield
in child custody proceedings. In In re A.J.S.,4 2 D.S., the mother of
a seventeen-year-old mentally retarded epileptic, A.J.S., appealed
the order of the district court that had awarded custody of the
child to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services pursuant to a finding that A.J.S. was a youth in need of care. At trial,
the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services had
presented evidence tending to show that A.J.S. was an abused and
neglected child who had suffered numerous unexplained injuries,
and that D.S. was not adequately concerned for A.J.S.'s cleanliness
and hygiene. Further, a clinical psychologist who had conducted a
court-ordered psychological examination of D.S. had testified that
D.S. had "some organic brain damage as well as a personality disorder termed 'inadequate personality,' -43 which interfered with
her ability to "deal adequately and care for A.J.S. over the long
term.

'44

On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, D.S. challenged
the admission of the psychologist's testimony as violative of the
psychologist-patient privilege.4 5 The supreme court rejected her argument and in fact determined that no psychologist-patient privilege existed between D.S. and the court-appointed psychologist.
The supreme court reached this conclusion on the basis of the laning that her mental condition prevented her from properly caring for her children and that

she was unable to provide them with a stable environment." Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Mont. , 630 P.2d 217 (1981).
A.J.S., Mont. at , 630 P.2d at 220.
Id.
D.S. also raised three other issues on appeal:
-

1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the finding that AJS is a youth in need of
care?

3. Did the admission of psychologists' testimony resulting from a court-ordered psychological evaluation violate DS's constitutional right of privacy?

4. Does the delay in the adjudication of this matter necessitate reversal?
Id. at 219.
The court responded that:
(1) clear and convincing evidence of child's unexplained physical injuries and

mother's inadequate concern for cleanliness and hygiene of child supported trial
court's findings; .. . (3) mother could not raise for first time on appeal contention
that psychologist's testimony resulting from court ordered psychological evaluation
violated her constitutional right of privacy; and (4) delay of 20 months from removal
of child from mother's home to trial court's final order did not necessitate reversal.
Id. at 217-18.
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guage of Montana's privilege statute,4 6 which "places the relationship of psychologist and client on the same status as attorney and
client. '47 A client in the attorney-client context is entitled to claim
the privilege with regard to communications made to a lawyer who
was, at the time the communication was made, acting as the client's "legal advisor for the purpose of securing professional advice
or aid upon the subject of the client's rights and liabilities.' 8 The
court reasoned that, because the lower court had ordered the psychological evaluation, D.S. had not initiated the relationship for
purposes of "securing professional assistance.' 0 Therefore, the
privilege did not extend to the communications made in the course
50
of that evaluation.
The court reached this decision in spite of the fact that D.S.
had had previous contacts with the court-appointed psychologist in
an unrelated matter. Even assuming arguendo that the prior contacts established a psychologist-patient relationship, the court
stated that "[in some instances, the best interests of the child
require some degree of flexibility in procedure to insure that all
evidence pertaining to the best interests of the child may be
'51
considered.
The facts of Von Goyt are easily distinguishable from those of
A.J.S. Most notably, the communications at issue in A.J.S. were
made in response to a court order. Since the court appointed the
psychologist to evaluate D.S. within the context of the allegations
made by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services in
its petition to gain custody of A.J.S., D.S. reasonably could not expect that such communications would be entitled to the protection
of the Montana privilege statute.2 To extend the privilege to such
communications would frustrate the court's purpose in ordering
the evaluation. Conversely, in Von Goyt, Ms. Von Goyt had every
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1980) (now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807
(1985)).
47. A.J.S., Mont. at _
630 P.2d at 221.
48. Id. (citing Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Assoc., 166 Clo. 280..- 443 P.2d 708,
716 (1968)).

49.

A.J.S.,

-

Mont. at _,

630 P.2d at 221.

50. Id; see also Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEo. WAst. L
REv. 53, 80 (1965).
51. A.J.S., Mont. at -,
630 P.2d at 221 (citing In re T.E.R, 180 Mont. 340,
590 P.2d 1117 (1979)) (emphasis added).
52. See Guernsey, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in Child Placement:A Relevancy Analysis, 26 Vu. L Rav. 955, 964-67 (1981).
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reason to expect that communications made to the psychiatrists
and psychologists who were treating her would remain privileged
and confidential. Her relationships with these professionals were
strictly for the purpose of treatment. While the court in Von Goyt
had every chance to order a neutral psychological examination of
Ms. Von Goyt, that alternative never appears even as a suggestion
within the court's opinion. Moreover, the court never questioned
the existence of the privileged relationship in Von Goyt, while the
A.J.S. court specifically held that D.S. and the psychologist had
not established such a relationship."
The Von Goyt court errs similarly in relying upon In re Norwood5" as support for overriding the psychologist-patient privilege
in custody proceedings. In Norwood, the juvenile court found the
five minor Norwood children to be neglected and dependent. The
court placed all five children in the custody of the county social
services department and took the matter of termination of parental rights under advisement. 55
Before the trial court could decide the question of parental
rights, the Norwoods appealed, assigning as error the admission
into evidence of the testimony of two psychiatrists who had treated
both parents.5 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile
court judgment on the ground that the Nebraska statute excluded
communications to a physician from the protection of the privilege 57 "inany judicial proceedings . . .regarding injuries to children .... , The supreme court found that the term "injury" was
53. A.J.S., Mont. at , 630 P.2d at 221.
54. 194 Neb. 595, 234 N.W.2d 601 (1975).
55. Norwood, 194 Neb. at , 234 N.W.2d at 602.
56. Id. Appellants also raised two other issues on appeal: (1) whether section 43-201
R.R.S. (1943) (defining the jurisdiction of the juvenile court) and section 43-209 R.R.S.
(1943) (providing for the disposition of children found to be neglected or dependent) are
constitutional and (2) whether the evidence was insufficient for a determination that the
children were neglected and dependent. Norwood, 194 Neb. at -, 234 N.W.2d at 602. The
court held that the Norwoods had waived the issue of constitutionality by failing to raise it
at trial and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding that the Norwood
children were neglected and dependent. Id. at -,
234 N.W.2d at 601.
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1206 (1943) (repealed and reissued 1975) (current version at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979)).
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1207 (Supp. 1965). The Norwood court cites the pertinent
language to "[flormer section 25-1207, R.R.S. 1943." Norwood, 194 Neb. at -,
234
N.W.2d at 602. The language discussed in the opinion is actually part of a 1965 amendment
to the 1943 statute. That amended version appears at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1207 (Supp.
1965) (repealed and reissued 1975) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979)).
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comprehensive and included the neglect experienced by the Norwood children. Thus, the court held that neglect "constitute[s] one
of the exceptions referred to in the statute and the [psychiatric]
evidence was [therefore] properly admitted." 9
Thus, the Von Goyt court again cited a case from a jurisdiction whose privilege statute is very different from Alabama's.60 Nebraska's statute by its terms exempts from the privilege communications to a physician in a number of contexts, including
"proceedings under the Separate Juvenile Court Act 1 as regards
injuries

to

children.

'6 2

The

Alabama

statute

contains

no

exceptions.
D. v. D.,63 a case which the Von Goyt court also relied on without analysis, actually presents an alternative to forcing the psychologist-patient privilege to yield. D. v. D. involved divorce proceedings in which both husband and wife sought custody of their
two children. Both parties consented to evaluations by a court-appointed psychiatrist to assist the court in resolving the custody dispute. Ms. D. had previously been committed to a mental hospital.
Mr. D., in connection with his custody claim, moved prior to trial
for leave to depose one of Ms. D.'s physicians, and for an order
directing that doctor and the hospital to which Ms. D. had been
committed to produce all of her medical records for inspection and
copying. Ms. D. invoked the physician-patient privilege" to prevent disclosure of any medical information. 5
The New Jersey Superior Court granted Mr. D.'s motion to
subpoena Ms. D.'s medical records for inspection, but greatly qualified that order to permit inspection only by the court. The court
stated that the parties would be informed as to the contents of the
records only in the event and to the extent that the court relied on
59. Norwood, 194 Neb. at _

234 N.W.2d at 603.

60. Cf. supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. The Von Goyt court, in its reference
to Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1977), failed to note that the
Florida privilege statute contains an exception into which Critchlow fell, while Alabama has
no similar exception in its privilege statute. Id.
61. NE. REV. STAT. §§ 43-228 to -239 (1943) (current version at Na& REv. STAT. §§ 432111 to -2127 (Supp. 1982)).
62. Norwood, 194 Neb. at _,
234 N.W.2d at 602.
63. 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260 A.2d 255 (1969).
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.84A-22.2 (West 1968) (current version at id. (West 1976 &
Supp. 1985)).
65. D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. at -,
260 A.2d at 256.
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portions of the record to resolve the custody dispute.66
The court then denied Mr. D.'s discovery motions to inspect
and copy the medical records and to depose his wife's physician.
The court reasoned that while "fundamental policy considerations
...dictate the need for flexibility in applying the technical rules of
evidence '6 7 in custody disputes, nevertheless the physician-patient
privilege continued to be available to the wife unless her competence could not be ascertained by other means, such as by courtordered psychiatric examination. 6 Thus, the court found an alternative to discarding the privilege altogether: even though the interests of the child outweigh the policies promoted by the privilege,
the court would respect the privilege unless it saw no reasonable
alternative to disclosure."9 In weighing the competing values, the
court preserved its right to override the privilege in cases in which
the proposed alternative might be inadequate:
[S]hould the defending parent refuse to submit to psychiatric evaluation as required by the court, we would be unable to evaluate the
fitness of that parent in terms of possible mental illness, although
we know that there has been a recent commitment to a mental hospital. Under such circumstances the court may well be compelled to
conclude that there is no alternative to permitting discovery of med70
ical evidence notwithstanding the privilege.
The D. v. D. court, although its primary concern lay with the
best interests of the child, continued to uphold the parents' rights
by providing an alternative which served both the child's interests
in a proper custody resolution and the patient's right to expect her
privileged communications to remain confidential. The Von Goyt
court, on the other hand, never explored the possibility that both
interests could be adequately served by ordering Ms. Von Goyt to
undergo a psychiatric examination by a court-appointed neutral
psychologist.
The courts in both D. v. D. and in Von Goyt rely in part on
the New York case of People ex rel. Chitty v. Fitzgerald.71 Fitzger66.

Id. at

,

260 A.2d at 257.

67. Id.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,
-,

260 A.2d at 258.
260 A.2d at 257-58.
260 A.2d at 258.

71. 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (S. Ct. 1963). The court in D. v. D. cites Fitzgerald as support for the procedure by which the judge examines the medical reports in camera
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ald was a custody proceeding instituted by the wife seeking an alteration of the visitation rights granted to her husband if his Veterans Administration Hospital records revealed that he was
currently mentally ill. Mr. Chitty, her husband, responded by asserting the physician-patient privilege to prevent disclosure of his
medical records and by refusing to undergo any psychological evaluation to determine his current mental condition.72
Under these circumstances, the court ruled that it could read
Chitty's medical records, "without making that report part of the
record in the proceeding,' 73 in order to determine the necessity of

any modification of Chitty's visitation rights. In light of the judge's
examination of Chitty's medical report, the court denied Chitty
any further visitation "unless [he] consents to a psychiatric exami,,74
nation ....
As the D. v. D. opinion noted, in Fitzgerald "[tihe hospital
report was not made part of the record in that proceeding but, instead, the judge himself examined the hospital record to determine
its relevancy in the custody controversy."" And the fact that Mr.
Chitty was given an opportunity to undergo psychiatric evaluation
in Fitzgerald,as was Ms. D. in D. v. D., underscores the reluctance
of each of these courts to override the patient privilege without
first exploring reasonable alternatives in order to protect both the
child's best interest and the confidentiality of protected
communications.
Koump v. Smith, 6 the last case cited without analysis by the
Von Goyt court in support of suspending the privilege in custody
proceedings, in fact provides no support at all for that proposition.
Koump was not a custody suit. It was a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident between plaintiff and defendant. The issue of privileged
communications arose when the plaintiff applied for a court order
directing the defendant to "execute and acknowledge written auwithout making them part of the court record. D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. at _..._, 260 A.2d at
257. The Von Goyt court, on the other hand, cites Fitzgerald,without any analysis, for the
proposition that the psychologist-patient privilege must yield in custody proceedings. Von
Goyt, 461 So. 2d at 823.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

244 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42.
Fitzgerald,40 Misc. 2d at _
244 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (emphasis added).
Id. at _,
244 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
Id. at _,
D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. at _ 260 A.2d at 257.
25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969).
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thorization permitting plaintiff or his attorneys '77 to obtain copies
of defendant's hospital records made immediately following the accident. The plaintiff sought these records, over the defendant's objection that the records were privileged communications between a
physician and patient, for the purpose of proving that defendant
had been intoxicated at the time of the accident and that the collision resulted from defendant's intoxication. The defendant's answer denied these allegations.
The trial court denied plaintiff's application, 78 and plaintiff
appealed. A divided appellate division affirmed the lower court's
ruling and "granted leave to appeal certifying the following question: 'Was the order of this court [denying plaintiff's application]
. . . properly made?' ",7' The New York Court of Appeals answered
the question affirmatively in an opinion that focused on the issue
of whether defendant's mental or physical condition was in controversy within the meaning of a New York statute which excludes
medical records and communications relating to conditions in controversy from the physician-patient privilege.8 0 The court of appeals held that a party waives the privilege "by bringing or defending a personal injury action in which mental or physical condition
is affirmatively put in issue. "81 The court elaborated:
We do not hold that the privilege is waived whenever a party defends an action in which his mental or physical condition is in controversy. The rule laid down today is limited to cases in which a
defendant affirmatively asserts the condition either by way of counterclaim or to excuse the conduct complained of by the plaintiff.82
The defendant in Koump did not affirmatively raise his condition, either as a counterclaim or as an excuse for the conduct of
which plaintiff complained. The defendant merely had answered
the plaintiff's allegations in the negative, and the court accordingly
Koump, 25 N.Y.2d at , 250 N.E.2d at 858, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
Id. at -,
250 N.E.2d at 858-59, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59.
Id. at -,
250 N.E.2d at 859, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3121(a) (McKinney 1963) (current version at N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 3121(a) (McKinney 1970)).
81. Koump, 25 N.Y. at -,
250 N.E.2d at 861, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 864 (emphasis
added); cf. supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (explaining how the appellant in
Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) affirmatively introduced
her mental condition into the controversy).
82. Koump, 25 N.Y. at , 250 N.E.2d at 861, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 864 (emphasis in
original).
77.
78.
79.
80.
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found that his hospital records remained privileged
communications."
Nowhere in the Koump opinion does the court refer to custody disputes. And nowhere in its analysis does the court discuss
situations outside of the context of the affirmative waiver in which
the privilege must yield. Why the Von Goyt court cited Koump in
support of the exclusion of the privilege in custody cases remains a
mystery. The only clue may lie in the Von Goyt court's conclusion
that
where the issue of the mental state of a party to a custody suit is
clearly in controversy, and a proper resolution of the custody issue
requires disclosure of privileged medical records, the psychologistpatient privilege must yield.'
The Von Goyt opinion, however, contains no indication that
Ms. Von Goyt affirmatively introduced her mental condition into
the controversy. The opinion, therefore, fails to bring Von Goyt
within the Koump exclusion, which is based upon a party's affirmative waiver of her privilege. Indeed, the court clearly stated that
Ms. Von Goyt had not waived her privilege.88
Perhaps the court was attempting to fashion a rule that would
place inherently "in controversy" the mental condition of a party
to a custody dispute, so that the privilege must yield regardless of
who raises the issue. Such a rule, however, would seem to require a
more reasoned explanation than the single cursory statement made
by the Von Goyt court, particularly in a case of first impression,
because such a rule would carve a deep judicial restriction into the
statutory privilege.
The Von Goyt court cited Perry v. Fiumano" as authority for
its general statement that the privilege must yield in custody proceedings in which a party's mental condition is in controversy. The
Fiumano court did indeed state that "the mental and emotional
state of a custodial parent is of great concern to the court regardless of [whether a party affirmatively asserts the issue or not]." 87
83. Id. at _
250 N.E.2d at 864-65, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 868.69.
84. In re Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (citing Perry v. Fiumano,
61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 1978)).
85. Id. at 823.
86. 61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 1978), cited in Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d
at 823.
87. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d at - 403 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
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However, the Fiumano court acknowledged that the privilege may
not be set aside without "a showing beyond 'mere conclusory statements' that resolution of the custody issue requires revelation of
the protected material." ' Presumably, then, a showing by the
party seeking the protection of the privilege that other means are
available to provide the evidence needed for resolution of the custody issue (a court-ordered psychological evaluation, for example)
should operate to salvage the privilege. Of further significance is
that the Von Goyt court failed to note that Fiumano specifically
concerned a motion for the disclosure of communications made to
a social worker, rather than to a psychiatrist. The New York court
noted, however, that the records sought-those of a counseling
center-might include evaluations by physicians and psychologists,
and so might involve the doctor-patient and psychologist-client
privileges peripherally."9 And finally, since the Fiumano court refused to grant the discovery motion before it, the language quoted
by the Von Goyt court is dictum.
IV.

Factors the Court Should Consider in Proceedings Concerning Child Custody and Termination of Parental Rights

The single controlling consideration in a custody proceeding is
"the best interests of the child."9 " Under Alabama's 1984 Child
Protection Act,91 a court may terminate parental rights if it
finds from clear and convincing evidence, competent, material and
relevant in nature, that the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that
the conduct or condition of the parents is such as to render them
88. Id. at

-,

403 N.Y.S.2d at 386 (emphasis added).

89.

-,

403 N.Y.S.2d at 384.

Id. at

90. E.g., Cook, Family Law: Surveying 15 Years of Change in Alabama, 36 ALA. L.
Rav. 419, 461 (1985) (citing Brill v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 435, 436, 304 So. 2d 595, 596 (1974);
Reaves v. Reaves, 399 So. 2d 311, 312 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Warren v. Warren, 386 So. 2d
1166, 1168 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Bynum v. Bynum, 52 Ala. App. 633, 635, 296 So. 2d 722,
724 (Civ. App.), cert. denied, 292 Ala. 714, 296 So. 2d 725 (1974)); Guernsey, supra note 52,
at 955 (citing Bertin & Klein, Pennsylvania's Developing Child Custody Law, 25 VILL. L.
REv. 752, 760 (1980)); Oster, Custody Proceeding:A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21, 21 (1965); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. REv.
672, 677-78 (1942); Comment, Measuring the Child's Best Interests - A Study of Incomplete Considerations,44 DEN. L.J. 132, 132-33 (1967); Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81 Dicm. L. Rav. 733, 733 (1977).
91.

ALA. CODE §§ 26-18-1 to -10 (Supp. 1985).
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unable to properly care for the child and that such conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future .... 0'
The Act enumerates a broad list of factors which the court
must consider in the involuntary termination of parental rights
and responsibilities:
(1) That the parents have abandoned the child...;
(2) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency
of the parent, or excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances, of
such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for
needs of the child;
(3) That the parent has tortured, abused, cruelly beaten or
otherwise maltreated the child, or attempted to torture, abuse, cruelly beat or otherwise maltreat the child, or the said child is in clear
and present danger of being thus tortured, abused, cruelly beaten, or
otherwise maltreated as evidenced by such treatment of a sibling;
(4) Conviction of and imprisonment for a felony;
(5) Unexplained serious physical injury to the child under
such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries resulted
from the intentional conduct or willful neglect of the parent;
(6) That reasonable efforts by the department of pensions
and security or licensed public or private child care agencies leading
toward the rehabilitation of the parents have failed.
(b) Where a child is not in the physical custody of its parent or
parents appointed by the court, in addition to the foregoing, shall
also consider, but is not limited to the following.
(1) Failure by the parents to provide for the material
needs of the child or to pay a reasonable portion of its support,
where the parent is able to do so.
(2) Failure by the parents to maintain regular visits with
the child in accordance with a plan devised by the department, or
any public or licensed private child care agency, and agreed to by
the parent.
(3) Failure by the parents to maintain consistent contact
or communication with the child.
(4) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his circumstances to meet the needs of the child in accordance with agreements reached, including agreements reached with local departments of pensions and security or licensed child-placing agencies, in
an administrative review or a judicial review.
(c) In any case where the parents have abandoned a child as
92.

Id. § 26-18-7.
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herein defined and such abandonment continues for a period of six
months next preceding the filing of the petition, such facts shall
that the parents are unable or
constitute a rebuttable presumption
3
unwilling to act as parents.
Although the court must consider the listed factors, the court
may also hear any evidence "which is competent, relevant and material to the issue before it." 9' In addition to the considerations
mandated by the Act, Alabama courts are to consider the following: The emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs
of the child; the environment of the home of the parent seeking
custody; the age, character, stability, mental and physical health of
the parent; the parent's capacity to and interest in providing for
the needs of the child; a move out of state;9 5 the child's preference
97
as to custody;9 6 and mental commitment of the custodial parent.
The purpose of the Alabama 1984 Child Protection Act is to
"provide meaningful guidelines to be used by the juvenile court in
cases involving the termination of parental rights in such a manner
as to protect the welfare of children by providing stability and continuity in their lives, and at the same time to protect the rights of
their parents."9 8 Thus, although the Act does not provide specific
means by which parental rights are to be observed, except to the
93. Id.
94. Worley v. Jinks, 361 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978); cf. ALA. CODE § 12-1565(d),(e) (1975 & Supp. 1985) (Chapter 15 of Title 12 of the Alabama Code is the chapter on
juvenile proceedings; the subsections noted allow the court to consider evidence that is competent, relevant, and material in determining the disposition of children who are alleged to
be delinquent, dependent, or in need of supervision, as defined by that chapter); Cook,
supra note 90, at 462-65 (discussing various factors that have been considered by Alabama
courts in custody proceedings).
95. R. McCuRLEY, JR. & P. DAVIS, ALABAMA DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND CHILD CUSTODY §
21-4, at 175 (1982 and Supp. 1984) (citing Crane v. Crane, 392 So. 2d 242 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980); Hallford v. Hallford, 390 So. 2d 295 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980)).
96. R. McCuRLBY, JR. & P. DAVIS, supra note 95, § 21-4, at 175 (citing Rogers v. Rogers, 345 So. 2d 1368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)); Cook, supra note 90, at 463 (preference is a noncontrolling factor in Alabama) (citing Hattrick v. Hattrick, 52 Ala. App. 539, 541, 295 So. 2d
260, 261 (Civ. App. 1974)); see also Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Interview as of September 1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4089 (Sept. 28, 1982) (in approximately 18 states the child's preference is considered as a factor in custody determinations).
97. R. MCCURLEY, JR & P. DAVIS, supra note 95, § 21-4, at 175 (citing Quinn v. Quinn,
351 So. 2d 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)). But cf. Parks v. Parks, 275 Ala. 613, 157 So. 2d 212
(1963), cited in R. McCuRLEY, JR. & P. DAVIS, supra note 95, § 23-4, at 190, for the proposition that "mental illness may not warrant a change of custody if the children are being
credibly cared for." Id.
98. ALA. CODE § 26-18-2 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
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degree that "[a]ppeals from an order terminating parental rights
. . . shall have precedence over all other cases in the court to
which the appeal is taken,"9 9 the Act's statement of purpose clearly
indicates that a court is not to disregard the rights of parents in
proceedings to terminate parental custody. Arguably, then, even
though the primary consideration in a custody proceeding is the
child's best interests, the statutory guidelines governing those proceedings also direct the court to observe a parent's rights to the
fullest extent possible. Both child and parent are entitled to expect
the court's protection, though perhaps not to equal degrees.
V.

The Psychologist-Patient Privilege in Custody Proceedings:
Alternatives to Automatic Revelation

One right for which a party before any court may expect protection is the right to prevent privileged communications from being involuntarily disclosed. "[F]our fundamental conditions are
recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against
the disclosure of communications":
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentialitymust be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be
recognized.100
Alabama has chosen to recognize a number of privileges by
statute, 10 1 including a statute that protects confidential communi99.

Id.

100. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
101.

See, e.g., ALA.CODE § 34-8A-21 (1985) (concerning confidential relations between

licensed professional counselors or certified counselor associates and clients); id. § 12-21-142
(1975) (exemption of news-gathering persons from disclosing sources); id. § 12-21-161 (1975)
(attorney-client privilege); id. § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1985) (protecting confidential communications made to a member of the clergy).
While there is no statutory doctor-patient testimonial privilege in Alabama, the Ala-
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cations between a patient and his or her licensed psychologist or
psychiatrist. Section 34-26-12 of the Alabama Code provides:
For the purpose of this chapter, the confidential relations and
communications between licensed psychologists and licensed psychiatrists and clients are placed upon the same basis as those provided
by law between attorney and client, and nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to require any such privileged communication to
be disclosed. 102
Alabama's attorney-client privilege prevents an attorney from testifying, and the court from compelling him or her to testify, concerning "any matter or thing" of which he has gained knowledge
from the client, or concerning any advice given to the client in the
course of the attorney-client relationship, or given in anticipation
of that relationship, unless the client himself or herself calls the
attorney to testify.10 3 Notably, a total of forty-seven jurisdictions
provide some form of privilege protection for the psychologist-patient relationship.1 0 ' This widespread adoption of the privilege indicates that courts and legislatures accept the notion that communications between psychotherapist and patient meet the four
conditions set out by Wigmore, because the relationship "is one
that society desires to foster and protect, and ... without the confidentiality which the privilege provides, many people will not seek
therapeutic help."' 10 5
bama Supreme Court has held that there is an action in tort for a person damaged by a
doctor's revelation of communications made to him or her in a professional capacity. Horno
v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
102. ALA.CODE § 34-26-2 (1985). The Alabama psychologist-patient privilege, like that
privilege in 15 other jurisdictions, statutorily corresponds to the attorney-client privilege.
Dekraai & Sales, Privileged Communications of Psychologists, 13 PROF. PSVCYOLOOY 372,
374-75, 377 (1982).
Communications that fall within the protection of the psychologist-patient privilege
"include any information gained by the psychotherapist during treatment, either verbally or
through observation of the patient." Special Project, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1540 (1985).
103. ALA CODE § 12-21-161 (1975).
104. See DeKraai & Sales, supra note 102, Table 1, at 374; see also Special Project,
supra note 102, at 1539 n.59 (stating that only Alaska, Iowa, Nebraska, South Carolina, and
West Virginia have no form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege). Contra ALASKA STAT.
§ 08.86.200 (1962); see NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979) (which is a statutory physicianpatient privilege provision including certified psychologists within the definition of
"physician").
105. Guernsey, supra note 52, at 961 (citing Fisher, The PsychotherapeuticProfession
and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609, 611 (1964); Slovenko,
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The psychologist-patient privilege is particularly necessary in
child custody disputes: a party who is involved in or anticipates
involvement in such a dispute may be discouraged from seeking
help if he or she knows that communications made during treatment will be revealed in court.1 08 Moreover, disclosure of such
communications might injure the child by inducing his or her parents to forego needed therapy,10 7 therapy that in the long run
would prove highly beneficial to the child.
In addition to the special justification for the privilege when it
is associated with the possibility of custody proceedings, other
public policies support the psychologist-patient privilege in general.10 8 Traditionally, commentators have urged that the physician
and counselor privilege is "necessary to protect society's interest in
medical and counseling relationships by encouraging patients to
communicate necessary information to health professionals."'0 9
This "utilitarian justification" 110 is particularly relevant in the psychotherapy context, where confidentiality may be the basis of successful treatment,1 which, in turn, may depend totally upon a pa112
tient's willingness to confide.
Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L Rav. 175, 184 (1960);

Comment, Confidential Communication to a Psychotherapist:A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REv.384, 386-87 (1952); Comment, The Psychotherapists'Privilege, 12
WAsHiuRN L.J. 297, 302-05 (1973)).
106. See generally Guernsey, supra note 52 (a discussion of the psychologist-patient

privilege in the context of child custody proceedings).
107. Id. at 966.
108. See generally DeKraai & Sales, supra note 102; Guernsey, supra note 52;
Satzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L Rav. 597, 619625 (1980); Slovenko, supra note 105; Special Project, supra note 102; McCoRmcK

ON

Evw-

§ 98, at 244-45 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
109. Special Project, supra note 102, at 1542 (citing Slovenko, supra note 105, at 186).
110. Special Project, supra note 102, at 1542.
111. Saltzburg, supra note 108, at 620.
112. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized the special necessity for confidentiality:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His
capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without
DENCE

being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general rule ....
there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment. The
relationship may well be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client.
Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their

unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to com-
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Additionally, some commentators have offered the privacy rationale in support of the privilege.1 3 They argue that communications made by patients to psychotherapists raise the constitutionally recognized right of a patient to protect the uncontrolled
11 4
dissemination of private information about himself or herself.
Irrespective of which rationale persuaded a particular jurisdiction to adopt the psychologist-patient privilege, the evidence indicates that society as a whole values the protections that the privilege provides. In light of the combined strengths of the
justifications offered for the privilege, along with the fact that a
vast majority of jurisdictions have seen fit to provide statutorily
for some form of the privilege, 116 the decision to abrogate the privilege in certain cases deserves grave consideration.1 6 When a court
can obtain the needed information through less intrusive methods,
notions of fairness and equity require that the privilege remain
7
intact."
The starting point for a court, therefore, ought to be a strong
presumption against destroying the privilege in any case. Almost
any conceivable problem that would be so serious as to jeopardize
the best interests of the child would, in all likelihood, have manifested itself in behavior that could be proved without reaching
privileged material.
At least with regard to the Von Goyt decision, supporters of
the privilege might argue that easy cases make bad law, for in that
case, the Department of Pensions and Security alleged that the
nonmedical evidence, by itself, provided the court with sufficient
proof that Ms. Von Goyt's parental rights should have been termimunicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 242 (1972) (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, at 92 (1960)). The Proposed Rules included a psychiatristpatient privilege, but no physician-patient privilege; Congress rejected all the rules providing for specific privileges. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (approved Jan. 2, 1975). See also
M. GUT'TMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
113. Special .Project, supra note 102, at 1480-83, 1544 (citing Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 62
GEo. L.J. 61, 92, 117 (1973); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges
in Federal Court Today, 31 TU. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956); Saltzburg, supra note 108, at 61819).
114. Special Project, supra note 102, at 1545; see Guernsey, supra note 52, at 982-95.
115. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
116. See Guernsey, supra note 52, at 995-96.
117. See id.
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nated.1 18 Thus, the court in Von Goyt probably would have
reached the same result without the additional evidence contained
in the medical records. Such reasoning, taken one step further,
leads to the conclusion that the medical evidence was completely
unnecessary for a proper determination of the custody issue.
Therefore, the invasion of Ms. Von Goyt's privileged communications did not help the court to serve the children's welfare, but
simply compromised Ms. Von Goyt's privacy.
In cases that do not present the court with sufficient nonprivileged evidence upon which to resolve a custody matter, the court
should, to insure justice for both child and parent, seek alternative
sources for the information necessary to reach a decision that is in
the child's best interest. " ' Possible alternatives include giving the
parent the option of undergoing psychological evaluation by a neutral court-appointed psychotherapist, 120 who would then report his
118. Brief for Appellee at 19-20, In re Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d 821 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984).
The brief alleges that both Von Goyt children "spent considerable amounts of time in foster
care"; that even after four years of assistance from the Department of Pensions and Security, Ms. Von Goyt was "unable to maintain a consistently stable living arrangement"; that
neighbors had reported unusual activity in Ms. Von Goyt's home; and that Maude's day
care teacher reported that Maude had suffered an extreme and adverse personality change
after she was removed from foster care and returned to Ms. Von Goyt's custody. Id.
119. See, e.g., D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260 A.2d 255 (1969); supra notes 67-71
and accompanying text.
120. A court's authority to order a psychological examination is widely recognized as
inherent to the judicial power. Guernsey, supra note 52, at 956 n.7 and accompanying text;
Weihofen, supra note 50, at 75-76; accord R. SLOVENKO, supra note 33, at 361, 371-72.
The Alabama Juvenile Proceedings Act provides the court with the authority to order
an examination "of a parent or custodian who gives his consent and whose ability to care for
or supervise a child before the court is in issue." AL. CoD § 12-15-69 (1975).
One source of authority that at first might seem to be the obvious source of judicial
authority to order an examination is Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 35. However, if the
examined party requests a copy of the report of the examining physician, subsection (b)(1)
of that Rule entitles the party requesting the examination to receive from the examined
party "a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition ...... ALA.R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1) (emphasis added). That subsection would therefore place
the examined party in the difficult position of either foregoing the opportunity to prepare a
rebuttal to the examination report or making his privileged communications available to the
opposing party. Further, subsection (b)(2) states unequivocally that the examined party
"waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter
examine him in respect of the same mental or physical condition" by obtaining a copy of the
examination report or by deposing the examiner. ALA. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2). Hence, Rule 35
does not present a viable alternative in a situation where one of the parties seeks to protect
privileged communications.
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or her findings to the court. 121 After being presented with such an
option, the parent must weigh the value of keeping his or her privileged communications confidential against the risks involved in undergoing the evaluation.
Before it orders a psychological examination, however, the
court should establish that there is sufficient reason to believe that
a problem exists and also should be certain that such a problem
can be presented to the court only through psychological examination. That is to say, a court-ordered examination is in and of itself
an extraordinary measure. In taking such a step the court ought to
rely upon strong evidence (1) that the parent in question has severe psychological problems, (2) that these problems could be
presented to the court only through a psychological examination,
and (3) that these problems bear on the parent's fitness to be a
proper custodian of the child. No psychiatric evaluation or further
inquiry would be necessary if the court could determine, from the
parent's behavior alone, that the parent had emotional or mental
problems incompatible with retaining custody of a child; the evidence of concrete acts would suffice to show the parent's unfitness.
But even if there is a threshold showing of problems requiring
psychological evaluation, the privileged communications ought not
to be revealed. In that situation, the court should give the "suspect" parent a choice among several options: (1) submitting himself or herself to an independent psychological evaluation; (2)
waiving the privilege so that prior psychological evaluations may
be admitted; (3) or the court would have authority to say that in
the absence of the evidence it could gain from either of the two
preceding options, it is unable to determine the fitness of the parent in question and therefore it must not give the parent custody.
If an independent psychological evaluation is conducted, or if
the parent in question waives the privilege as to prior psychological
evaluations, the evidence so produced should first be viewed in
camera by the judge to see whether it reveals any information relevant to the parent's fitness as the proper custodian of the child.
121. E.g., Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re
A.J.S., 630 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1981); D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260 A.2d 255 (1969); Perry
v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 1978); People ex rel. Chitty v.

Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1963); see Guernsey, supra note 52;
R. SLOVENKO, supra note 33, at 361, 371-72; Weihofen, supra note 50, at 77-78; cf. Koump v.
Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969).
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The parent's psychiatric history would be subject automatically to
a protective order. Any information derived from the court-ordered
psychological examination, or any material discovered as a result
of the waiver of the privilege, would be sealed and could not be
divulged by any party except in the court proceeding itself. If the
parent consented to the court-ordered evaluation, any privileged
communications with her private therapist would remain
protected.
VII.

Conclusion

How best to balance the parent's rights against the child's best
interests presents an issue that is bound to come before Alabama
courts again. Yet future courts need not sacrifice justice to one interest or the other. When the opportunity next arises, the courts of
Alabama should accept the challenge of serving a child's best interest while preserving the parents' rights to the greatest extent possible. The alternatives proposed by this Article may, in some circumstances, require the courts to undertake additional steps in
reaching custody determinations; indeed, the courts may find that
proceedings involving privileged communications are time consuming and complicated. Yet the sacrifice of time and convenience is
little price to pay if the result is a proper custody resolution without unnecessary violation of a parent's rights. In the event that the
Von Goyt decision remains unmodified, parents who are in need of
psychotherapy may choose to forego treatment for fear that their
privileged communications will be revealed in a possible custody
proceeding. The child, ironically, is often the victim in such a
situation.
If future courts in Alabama unqualifiedly accept the position
of the Von Goyt court, attorney-client relationships, as well as psychologist-patient relationships, may suffer serious, long-term chilling effects. The attorney-client relationship may come under reevaluation as a result of Von Goyt, because the statute establishing
that privilege forms the basis of the psychologist-patient privilege.
Other jurisdictions with psychologist-patient privileges that correspond to their attorney-client privileges 2' have defined the bound122. DeKraai & Sales, supra note 103, at 374-75, 377.
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aries of the former by referring to the law governing the latter.
Alabama courts may do the same, since the Alabama psychologistpatient privilege statute, by its terms, invites comparison with the
attorney-client privilege. 2 When Alabama courts hand down decisions that erode the psychologist-patient privilege, litigators may
not be far behind in urging a reversal of the comparision when-as
advocates-such erosion would benefit their client's position. Alabama attorneys and those who use their services therefore have a
vital interest in correcting the Von Goyt decision.
The Alabama appellate courts should reconsider Von Goyt so
as to protect both confidential communications and the best interests of children.

123.
A.J.S.).
124.

See, e.g., In re A.J.S., 630 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1981); supra notes 42-50 (discussing
Supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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